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- IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS --
STOUFFER FOOD CORPORATION and/or 
LIBERTY MUTUAL INSURANCE COMPANY, 
Petitioners, 
v. 
UTAH LABOR COMMISSION, EMPLOYERS' 
REINSURANCE FUND, and KATHLEEN MAE ) 
MOORE, surviving spouse of William Moore, 
Respondents. 
) Court of Appeals 
) Appellate Court No.: 980227-CA 
) Priority No.: 7 
JURISDICTION IN THE COURT OF APPEALS 
The Utah Court of Appeals has jurisdiction in this matter pursuant to Utah Code Ann. 
§34A-2-801 (1997), Utah Code Ann. §63-46b-16 (1998), Utah Code Ann. §78-2a-3 (1996), 
and Rule 14 of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure. 
ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
1. Whether Utah Code Ann. §35-1-70 (1953) requires extended benefits beyond 
312 weeks from an employer or carrier. 
2. Whether Utah Code Ann. §35-1-68 (1988), as amended, eliminates liability of 
the Employers' Reinsurance Fund to pay death benefits. 
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STANDARD OF REVIEW 
This case presents a pure question of statutory construction which should be reviewed 
under a "correction of error" standard. Brown & Root v. Industrial Commission. 947 P.2d 
671 (Utah 1997); State v. Harmon. 910 P.2d 1196 (Utah 1996); and Zissi v. State Tax 
Commission. 842 P.2d 848 (Utah 1992). 
DETERMINATIVE PROVISIONS 
1. Utah Code Ann. §35-1-70 (1953)1: 
If any wholly dependent persons, who have been receiving the benefits of this title, at 
the termination of such benefits are yet in a dependent condition, and under all 
reasonable circumstances should be entitled to additional benefits, the industrial 
commission may, in its discretion, extend indefinitely such benefits: but the liability of 
the employer or insurance carrier involved shall not be extended, and the additional 
benefits allowed shall be paid out of the special fund provided for in Subdivision (1) of 
Section 35-1-68. 
2. Utah Code Ann. §35-1-68 (1988): 
Employers' Reinsurance Fund - Injury causing death - Burial expenses - Payments to 
dependents. 
(1) There is created an Employers' Reinsurance Fund for the purpose of making 
payments in accordance with Chapters 1 and 2, Title 35. This fund shall succeed to all 
monies previously held in the "Special Fund," the "Combined Injury Fund," or the 
"Second Injury Fund." Whenever this code refers to the "Special Fund," the 
"Combined Injury Fund," or the "Second Injury Fund" that reference is considered to 
1
 This statute has been recodified, without substantive change, as Utah Code Ann. §34A-
2-416 (1997). Because Mr. Moore died on May 13, 1991, all statutory references contained 
herein will be to those statutes in existence at the time of his death. 
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be the Employers' Reinsurance Fund. The state treasurer shall be the custodian of the 
Employers' Reinsurance Fund, and the commission shall direct its distribution. 
Reasonable administration assistance may be paid from the proceeds of the fund. The 
attorney general shall appoint a member of his staff to represent the Employers' 
Reinsurance Fund in all proceedings brought to enforce claims against it. 
(2) If injury causes death within a period of six years from the date of the accident, 
the employer or insurance carrier shall pay the burial expenses of the deceased as 
provided in Section 35-1-81, and further benefits in the amounts and to the persons as 
follows: 
(a)(i) If there are wholly dependent persons at the time of the death, the payment by 
the employer or its insurance carrier shall be 66 2/3% of the decedent's average weekly 
wage at the time of the injury, but not more than a maximum of 85 % of the state 
average weekly wage at the time of the injury per week and not less than a minimum of 
$45 per week, plus $5 for a dependent spouse, plus $5 for each dependent minor child 
under the age of 18 years, up to a maximum of four such dependent minor children, 
but no exceeding the average weekly wage of the employee at the time of the injury, 
and not exceeding 85 % of the state average weekly wage at the time of the injury per 
week. Compensation shall continue during dependency for the remainder of the period 
between the date of the death and the expiration of six years or 312 weeks after the date 
of the injury. 
(ii) The weekly payment to wholly dependent persons during dependency following 
the expiration of the first six-year period described in Subsection (2)(a)(i) shall be an 
amount equal to the weekly benefits paid to those wholly dependent persons during that 
initial six-year period, reduced by 50% of any weekly federal Social Security death 
benefits paid to those wholly dependent persons. 
(iii) The issue of dependency shall be subject to review by the commission at the 
end of the initial six-year period and annually thereafter. If in any such review it is 
determined that, under the facts and circumstances existing at teat time, the applicant is 
no longer a wholly dependent person, the applicant may be considered a partly 
dependent or nondependent person and shall be paid such benefits as the commission 
may determine under Section (2)(b)(ii). 
(iv) For purposes of any dependency determination, a surviving spouse of a 
deceased employee shall be conclusively presumed to be wholly dependent for a six-
year period from the date of death of the employee. This presumption shall no apply 
after the initial six-year period and, in determining the then existing annual income of 
the surviving spouse, the commission shall exclude 50% of any federal Social Security 
death benefits received by that surviving spouse. 
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(b)(i) If there are partly dependent persons at the time of the death, the payment shall 
be 66 2/3% of the decedent's average weekly w£ge at the time of the injury, but not 
more than a maximum of 85 % of the state average weekly wage at the time of the 
injury per week and not less than a minimum of $45 per week. Compensation shall 
continue during dependency for the remainder of the period between the date of death 
and the expiration of six years or 312 weeks after the date of injury as the commission 
in each case may determine. Compensation may not amount to more than a maximum 
of $30,000. the benefits provided for in this subsection shall be in keeping with the 
circumstances and conditions of dependency existing at thee date of injury, and any 
amount awarded by the commission under this subsection shall be consistent with the 
general provision of this title. 
(ii) Benefits to persons determined to be partly dependent under Subsection (2)(a)(iii) 
shall be determined by the commission in keeping with the circumstances and 
conditions of dependency existing at the time of the dependency review and may be 
paid in a weekly amount not exceeding the maximum weekly rate that partly dependent 
person would receive if wholly dependent. 
(iii) Payments under this section shall be paid to such persons during their 
dependency by the employer or its insurance carrier. 
(c) If there are wholly dependent persons and also partly dependent persons at the 
time of death, the commission may apportion the benefits as it considers just and 
equitable; provided, that the total benefits awarded to all parties concerned to not 
exceed the maximum provided for by law. 
(d) If there are wholly or partly dependent persons at the time of death and the total 
amount of the awards paid by the employer or its insurance carrier to said dependents, 
prior to the termination of dependency, including any remarriage settlement, does not 
exceed $30,000, the employer or its insurance carrier shall pay the difference between 
the amount paid and $30,000 into the Employers' Reinsurance Fund provided for in 
Subsection (1). 
3. Petitioners believe the following case to be persuasive authority: 
Hales v. Industrial Commission. 854 P.2d 537 (Utah Ct. App. 1993). A copy of Hales 
is attached hereto and incorporated herein by reference as Exhibit "1." 
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature of the Case and Course of Proceeding 
This case involves a dispute over the legal interpretation of Utah's Workers 
Compensation Act relative to the payment of death benefits. Kathleen Mae Moore, the 
surviving spouse of William Ray Moore, was receiving death benefits as a result of Mr. 
Moore's death on May 13, 1991. Death benefits were paid to Kathleen Mae Moore by 
petitioner, Liberty Mutual Insurance Company, through February 10, 1997. Thereafter, 
petitioner Liberty Mutual Insurance Company has continued to pay death benefits to Kathleen 
Mae Moore based upon a stipulation of the parties that the parties may seek a legal ruling 
relative to whether Ms. Moore's ongoing benefits should be paid by petitioners or by the 
Employers' Reinsurance Fund ("ERF"). 
This case was assigned to Administrative Law Judge Barbara A. Elicerio who, on 
August 4, 1997, set a briefing scheduling for the parties. (R. at 55.) On September 5, 1997, 
petitioners filed a Motion for Summary Judgment. On September 25, 1997, ERF filed its own 
Motion to Dismiss as well as a brief in response to petitioner's Motion for Summary 
Judgment. On October 3, 1997, petitioners filed a Reply Memorandum. 
On December 18, 1997, Administrative Law Judge Elicerio issued her Findings of 
Fact, Conclusions of Law and Order. A copy of this Order is attached hereto as Exhibit "2." 
On January 16, 1998, petitioners filed a Motion for Review with the Appeals Board of the 
Labor Commission of Utah. On March 27, 1998, the Appeals Board issued it Order Denying 
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the Motion for Review. A copy of the Order of the Appeals Board is attached hereto as 
Exhibit W3.M 
On April 24, 1998, petitioners filed a Petition for Review with the Utah Court of 
Appeals. 
Statement of Facts 
Because this dispute involves a legal interpretation of certain Utah statutes, no 
testimony was actually taken at the Labor Commission (R. at 47, 55.) However, there was no 
dispute among the parties about the basic factual development of this case.2 
1. On July 1, 1989, William Ray Moore, an employee of respondent Stouffer 
Food Corporation, suffered a severe on-the-job injury. He received temporary total disability 
benefits, temporary partial disability benefits, and permanent partial disability benefits at 
various times following his injury through May 13, 1991. 
2. On May 13, 1991, William Ray Moore died as a result of complications from 
his industrial injury. 
3. Kathleen Mae Moore is the surviving spouse of William Ray Moore. Following 
the death of William Ray Moore, Kathleen Mae Moore began receiving death benefits. 
Thereafter, Ms. Moore continued to receive death benefits from petitioner Liberty Mutual 
Insurance Company upon a stipulation of the parties that the parties may seek a legal 
interpretation of whether Ms. Moore's ongoing death benefits should be paid by petitioners or 
by ERF. 
2
 In fact, the attorney for ERF used the identical statement of facts in its brief as 
previously set forth by petitioners. (R. at 57, 75.) Respondent Moore did not file a separate brief; 
rather, she joined in the brief filed by ERF. (R. at 72.) 
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4. Kathleen Mae Moore is currently still dependent upon death benefits. 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
Utah Code Ann. §35-1-70 (1953) specifically limits the liability of an employer or 
carrier in death cases. It expressly places ongoing liability for such benefits on the Employers' 
Reinsurance Fund. Given the historical context of Section 70, and as found by the Utah Court 
of Appeals in Hales, supra, petitioners submit that this Court should adopt the plain language 
of the statute and order ongoing death benefits to be paid to Ms. Moore from ERF. 
Utah Code Ann. §35-1-68 (1988) does not eliminate ERF's liability for death benefits 
after 312 weeks. The specific language in the statute creates the Employers' Reinsurance Fund 
"for the purpose of making payments in accordance with Chapters 1 and 2, Title 35." The 
statute only requires employers to pay 312 weeks of benefits, with ongoing benefits, as 
outlined in Utah Code Ann. §35-1-70 (1953), to be paid "out of the special fund provided for 
in Subdivision (1) of Section 35-1-68." Section 68 also requires employers/carriers to pay 
benefits, under certain circumstances, directly to ERF, an indication of ERF's liability to pay 
death benefits under this statute. In 1993, the Court of Appeals in Hales, supra, specifically 
recognized ERF's liability to pay "a continuation of benefits by the fund [ERF] in situations 
where the ERF's employer's responsibility has first been determined within the six-year 
period . . . ." Id. at 542. Only in 1994, following this Court's opinion in Hales, did the 
Legislature amend Section 68 to place the liability for the payment of death benefits after 312 
weeks upon the employer or carrier. 
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While administrative law judge Elicerio claims that the re-draft of Section 68 in 1979 
was "not a model of clarity" (R. at 105), petitioners submit that the plain language of Section 
68 and Section 70, particularly given the historical context of the statutes, requires ERF to pay 
death benefits after an employer or carrier pays the first 312 weeks of benefits. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
UTAH CODE ANN. §35-1-70 (1953) SPECIFICALLY 
PROVIDES FOR THE EMPLOYERS' REINSURANCE FUND 
TO PAY DEATH BENEFITS AFTER THE FIRST SIX YEARS. 
At the time of Mr. Moore's injury, Utah Code Ann. §35-1-70 (1953) stated: 
If any wholly dependent persons, who have been receiving the benefits of this 
title, at the termination of such benefits are yet in a dependent condition, and 
after all reasonable circumstances should be entitled to additional benefits, the 
industrial commission may, in its discretion, extend indefinitely such benefits; 
but the liability of the employer or insurance carrier shall not be extended, and 
the additional benefits allowed shall be paid out of the special fund provided for 
in Subdivision (1) of Section 35-1-68. 
Emphasis supplied. 
Petitioners assert that the language in Utah Code Ann. §35-1-70 (1953) is clear and 
unequivocal. Based upon the clarity of this statutory language, the Utah Court of Appeals 
should award continuing benefits to respondent Kathleen Mae Moore from the Employers' 
Reinsurance Fund. The full impact of Utah Code Ann. §35-1-70 (1953) is better understood 
following a historical analysis of the statute. 
-8-
A. Historical Background of Utah Code Ann. $35-1-70 (1953). 
The historical luikginiiiiu m Sn linn u 11a* IIMMIIY rn ii\y\'d :i (lei.ulnl .ui.ihsis in the 
matter of Hales v. Industrial Commission, supra. In Hales, the Utah Court of Appeals noted 
that the predecessor of the present statute for dependent death benefits was enacted in I'» 7, 
111,(1 inn > id t t h i n ill n i p k i u i mi iii'i in in is, in in HI n , iv In i it* t its ton MX y e a r s a f t e r t h e d a t e o f 
injury, but no longer, regardless of the state of dependency of the surviving spouse or child. 
The Court of Appeals in Hales further noted that the Utah Legislature in ;m aitniifii lo 
remedj ' this apparc "Mill rn;trtnl (lit statuton ancestor of current Utah Code Ann. 
§35-1-70, as follows: 
If any wholly dependent persons, who have been receiving the benefits of this Act, and 
who, at the termination of such benefits are yet in a dependent condition, and under all 
reasonable circumstances, should be entitled to additional benefits, the industrial 
commission may, at its discretion, extend indefinitely such benefits; but the liability of 
the employer or insurance carrier involved shall not be extended, but the additional 
benefits allowed shall be paid out of the special fund provided for in subdivision (1) of 
this section. 
1921 Utah I aw Cli. 67, §3140(7) (emphasis supplied), as cited in Hales. 541. 
As part ot il i li MIMIUII uiutKsn ot SeUiiiii ih ml ui /\|i|H *nl *. in Utiles corn Imlt tl 
that the statutory format of the 1921 amendment remained essentially unchanged through the 
date of the opinion in Hales in 1993. The Court of Appeals stated: 
In over 70 years since the words now found in Section 70 were originally 
adopted, they have remained essentially unchanged. The only significant 
change has been that the provision was taken out of the predecessor of the death 
benefits section — Section 68 — and made it's own self-standing section in 1933. 
Utah Rev. Stat. §42-1-66 (1933), Although this provision for continuing death 
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benefits in special cases has remained a self-contained provision up to the 
present day codification in §35-1-70, its origin as part of a death benefits section 
is significant. 
Hales at 541-42. 
The discretion of the Utah Industrial Commission to extend death benefits was 
eliminated in a 1973 amendment. As noted in Hales: 
Under this 1973 amendment, death benefits were to be paid after six years from 
the date of injury, from the special fund provided for in §35-1-68(1), until the 
termination of dependency. This amendment obviated the need for dependents 
to seek the discretionary extension of death benefits under Section 70 because 
the benefits were now extended as a right, assuming only that the individual 
remained in a dependent condition. The 1973 amendment, automatically 
extending benefits, was recodified in 1979 as Utah Code Ann. §35-1-
68(2)(b)(ii) (1979), pursuant to legislation that further refined calculation of 
benefits to be paid "following the expiration of the first six-year period." 1979 
Utah Laws Ch. 138, Section 3. 
Id. at 542. 
In summary, the Court of Appeals in Hales specifically recognized that a wholly 
dependent person, already receiving death benefits, was entitled to receive, automatically, 
ongoing death benefits, after six years from the date of injury, from the "special fund." Thus, 
Kathleen Mae Moore, the admittedly wholly dependent person in the case at bar, should be 
entitled to receive ongoing death benefits from the Employers' Reinsurance Fund. 
B. Utah Code Ann. $35-1-70 (1953) was in effect on July L 1989. 
The law to apply in any given case is the law in existence at the time of the industrial 
injury. Smith v. Industrial Commission. 549 P.2d 448 (Utah 1976). In the present case, Utah 
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Code Ann. §35-1-70 (1953) was in effect at both the time of Mr. Moore's injury and his 
subsequent death, and contained the exact language as cueii ht •„:.• ..,-.,. le terms of 
Si-. * te'uituJ i • ependent 
persons. Rather, ongoing benefits "shall be paid out of the special fund provided for in 
subdivision (1) of §35" I -b8. " 
l r . _ St .mv ^ mandatory. Ihe Labor Commission may not 
unilaterally extend the liability of the employer or carrier to pay ongoing death benefits to a 
wholly dependent person, ;., .he present case, thei e is no dispt ite tl lat Katl lleei i IV i;n Moui e is 
a wholly dependent person for the purpose of receiving ongoing death benefits. Accordingly, 
Ms Moore should be entitled to receiving ongoing death benefits, under this specific statute, 
from the Employers'Reinsurance I "i n: i ;:l 
POINT II 
UTAH CODE ANN. §35-1-68 (1988), AS AMENDED, DID 
NOT ELIMINATE ERF's LIABILITY FOR DEATH BENEFITS 
AFTER 312 WEEKS. 
Utah Code Ann. §35-1-68 (1988) was in effect at the time of Mr. Moore's injury of 
luU I l^ 'S1)' \ i i| 4 ill in I nlin1 sl'ituiM' i" iii"(l In ii in, s i p a nil " Both the Employers' 
Reinsurance Fund and the administrative law judge argue that a 1979 amendment to Utah Code 
Ann ,.::•• ..-68 eliminated any liability for the Employers' Reinsurance i utnJ in fu IKMIII 
l^ii..--'--s •' ^ ;v\\- :hr following arguments to demonstrate the inaccuracy of ERF's 
position. 
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A. ERF's Liability to Pay Benefits is Specifically Referenced in Utah Code Ann. 
§35-1-68 (1988). 
Utah Code Ann. §35-1-68 (1988) begins with the following sentence: 
(1) There is created an Employers' Reinsurance Fund for the purpose of making 
payments in accordance with Chapters 1 and 2. Title 35. This fund shall succeed to all 
monies previously held in the "Special Fund/ the "Combined Injury Fund," or the 
"Second Injury Fund." The state treasurer shall be the custodian of the Employers' 
Reinsurance Fund, and the commission shall direct its distribution. Reasonable 
administration assistance may be paid from the proceeds of the fund. The attorney 
general may appoint a member of his staff to represent the Employers' Reinsurance 
Fund in all proceedings brought to enforce claims against it. 
(Emphasis supplied.) 
The specific language of this statute recognizes that the Employers' Reinsurance Fund 
was created "for the purpose of making payments in accordance with Chapters 1 and 2, Title 
35." The Employers' Reinsurance Fund argues, however, that it has no liability whatsoever to 
make death benefit payments under this same statute. Petitioners respectfully submit that if the 
Utah Legislature had intended to eliminate liability on the part of the Employers' Reinsurance 
Fund, it could have easily done so within the body of the statute itself. To the contrary, the 
statutory language specifically states that the Employers' Reinsurance Fund is created "for the 
purpose of making payments . . . ." Thus,' it makes little sense for the Employers' 
Reinsurance Fund to argue that the language contained in Utah Code Ann. §35-1-68 (1988) 
actually means that the Employers' Reinsurance Fund is created for the purpose of not making 
payments in death cases. 
To the contrary, the Employers' Reinsurance Fund's liability is specifically referenced 
in Utah Code Ann. §35-1-70 (1953) which states, in pertinent part: " . . . and the additional 
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benefits allowed shall be paid out of the special fund provided for in Subdivision (1) of Section 
35-1-68." (Emphasis supplied J rims looking ai Nocuous *»H mil 'Dm 111'. • \ \ • • 
' ' n p i | " n s ; n i o V 'frili'M, the liability of the Employers' Reinsurance Fund for payment in 
death cases is crystal clear. 
In addition to the initial language ul Nation t\l* ml niifnins spcniV language that 
the employer or its insurance carrier to pay compensation "during dependency for the 
remainder of the period between the date of the death and the expiration of six years or 
weeks after tl le date -c f the injui j .' I J' - i I: G i li • ! i §35 1 68(2)( 0(0(1988) The 
Employers' Reinsurance Fund argues that, despite this distinct limitation on benefits payable 
from the employer or carrier, the employer or carrier must nevertheless implicitly continue to 
(id) .ill lk.ik.ius (In! in pin t Petitioners respectfully submit that 
this argument is inaccurate for the following six reasons. 
First, there is specific language within Section 68 requiring employer . 
pa> death benefits f :)ii: 312 * eel :s ' rhere is, however, no specific language in the statute 
requiring payments by employees or carriers beyond 312 weeks. Moreover, in connection 
with Section 70, there is a clear restriction on the liability of employer s -,i ati i ICI s lo | u v 
dealh benefits bevonJ H 1 weeks 
Second, Utah Code Ann. §35-l-68(2)(b) deals specifically with the payment of benefits 
to partly dependent persons .m il'ic iinic oi ikviiit'lii ] } 'iiliiiirii iliini11,, Milxiivision ihnv is w spn ml in 
reference that payments under this section "shall be paid to such persons during their 
dependency by the employer or its insurance carrier." (Utah Code Ann. §3> I -1>81J n r 
(lv ;s *. emphasis supplir'l l| line, ihr 1 t'j.usljluM'^|»t nth |!1^ iclnt'i ^ •: t rT l .nc r 
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or carrier should pay benefits under this particular circumstance. The Legislature did not 
make a similar reference for the payment of benefits by the employer or carrier oeyond 312 
weeks. Moreover, if the employer/carrier's liability to pay death benefits continued implicitly 
throughout the statute (as argued by ERF), the Legislature would not have deemed it necessary 
to reference liability "by the employer or its insurance carrier" later in the statute. 
Third, Utah Code Ann. §35-l-68(2)(d) specifically requires an employer or carrier to 
pay to the Employers' Reinsurance Fund the difference between the amounts paid to wholly or 
partly dependent persons and $30,000, if the total amount of the award paid by the employer 
or carrier is less than $30,000. It makes little sense to have an employer or carrier pay 
benefits to the Employers' Reinsurance Fund for death cases if the Employers Reinsurance 
Fund has no liability whatsoever for death benefits. The logical assumption under this 
language of Section 68 is that the employer/carrier which pays less than $30,000 in a death 
case (a relatively small amount) should be required to pay the difference to ERF to help fund 
ERF when it has to pay death benefits. 
Fourth, the Court of Appeals in Hales, supra, recognized that there had been a number 
of statutory changes to Utah Code Ann. §35-1-68. The Court stated: 
Again the 1921 amendment of the death benefits statute remedied the situation in which 
the six-year limitation had run, but an employee's survivors were still dependent and in 
need. This amendment allowed the Industrial Commission to extend benefits, at its 
discretion, for those dependent individuals. So long as death benefits as of right 
automatically ceased after the six year limitation, the escape valve provided in what is 
now section 70 was necessary to remedy injustices. However, in 1973 the death 
benefits statute was amended to automatically provide benefits "following the period 
during which the employer or its insurance carrier is required to pay benefits under this 
act . . . during the period of their dependency/ 1973 Utah Laws ch. 67, 
-14-
§ 5 (codified as Utah Code Ann. § 35-1-68(4) (1973)) I Jnder this 1973 amendment, 
death benefits were to be paid, after six years from the date of injury, from the special 
fund provided for in section 35-1-68(1) until the termination of dependency. n5 This 
amendment obviated the need for dependents to seek the discretionary extension of 
death benefits under section 70 because the benefits were now extended as of right, 
assuming only that the individual remained in a dependent condition. The 1973 
amendment, automatically extending benefits, was recodified in 1979 as Utah Code 
Ann, § 35-1 -68(2)(b)(ii)( 1979), pursuant to legislation that further refined the 
calculation of benefits to be paid "following the expiration of the first six-year p-
1979 Utah Laws ch. 138, § 3 . n6 
M. at 542. 
Significantly, endnote six, as cited in the foregoing quotation, explain: ... : ^ 
' ' '"s analysis. The Court stated: 
The former Utah Code Ann. § 35-l-68(2)(b)(ii)(1979) is now codified as §35-1-
68(2)(a)(ii)(1992 Supp.). We note that none of the several amendments to this section 
have any bearing on our analysis. Our analysis and conclusion apply to all of the 
permutations of section 68, 
Id. at 542. (Emphasis supplied.) 
The importance of the Hales decision will be outlined in greater detail below; nevertheless, the 
analysis of the decision in Hales expressly eviscerates ERF's argument that the ll'7v' 
ai nei ldi i lei it to Sectioi i 68 eliminated ERF's liability for the payment of death benefits. • 
Fifth, petitioners respectfully submit that if the statutory language of Section 70 does 
not apply to the present caj>i, tht statute tan neui .i|i|il, in ,i i ,isi IVliiiuhrr i i Lilk n * flu 
Employers' Reinsurance Fund and/or the Labor Commission to outline how death benefits can 
be paid by the Employers' Reinsurance Fund under Section 70 if not under the circumstances 
ot tin1, case. Simpl'i ( in, Sa!ii« ' i""1" i" , lanyiuyr IIIICINI'ILTJ '"I "I|" I ^ isl.i 'n" f u "m<«»e 
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than 70 years, applies unequivocally to this case absent clear, specific legislative action to the 
contrary. Since the Legislature has not amended Section 70 — it is still a good law today (see 
Utah Code Ann. §34A-2-416 (1997) - this Court should apply the plain language of the 
statute to this case. 
Finally, the Utah Legislature expressly amended Section 68 in 1994, adding specific 
language requiring the employer or its insurance carrier to pay death benefits following the 
expiration of the first 312-week period. Since Hales, supra, was decided in 1993, this 1994 
amendment was likely a response to that opinion. The amended statute, with the added 
language emphasized, states: 
The payment by the employer or its insurance carrier to wholly dependent 
persons during dependency following the expiration of the first 312-week period 
described in Subjection (5)(a)(i) shall be an amount equal to the weekly benefits 
paid to those wholly dependent persons during that initial 312-week period, 
reduced by 50% of any weekly federal Social Security death benefits paid to 
those wholly dependent persons. 
Utah Code Ann. §35-l-68(5)(a)(ii) (1994) (emphasis supplied). 
With this clear legislative change in 1994, ERF can now proclaim that it has no further 
liability for death benefits. However, up until this 1994 amendment, ERF must accept its 
liability to pay ongoing death benefits at the expiration of the first 312 weeks of 
employer/carrier liability. 
Overall, petitioners submit that the language of Section 68 clearly creates the 
Employers' Reinsurance Fund "for the purpose of making payments . . . ." Given the specific 
language of Section 68, and its historical context, this Court should reject ERF's argument that 
it has no liability, under any circumstances, to make death benefit payments under this statute. 
-16-
B. Hales vs. Industrial Commission, supra. Expressly Refers to Liability of the 
Employers' Reinsurance Fund for Death Benefits Under Section 68. 
sustained a compensable injury on May 24, 1982. He initially was awarded a 32% permanent 
partial impairment and, eventually, permanent total disability benefits. Petitioner died on 
benefits was denied by the carrier on the grounds of the six year statute of limitations. 1 k 
respondents in Hales also argued that the petitioner had an alternative remedy of obtaining 
The Court of Appeals quickly reversed on the statute of limitations' argument, finding 
that Section 68(2) acts as an improper statute of repose. I "he Court's analysis is i i lucl :i n IC i e 
meaningful in the present case relative to the argument that Section 70 provided an alternative 
remedy to benefits from ERF. 
.'; . . ; r u. n Hales concluded that Section 70 did not appi, 
petitioner had not been receiving benefits from the employer under Section 70 during the first 
six years of liability. The court stated: 
Ihis legislative history reveals that the phrase "receiving the benefits" under 
Section 70 was intended to refer to the beneficiary receiving benefits in his or 
her ow n rights i.e., death benefits payable to the dependent - not the 
employee receiving other kinds of benefits calculated in part, and only where 
the maximum was not reached, with reference to dependents Thus, Section 70 
simply does not apply to the instant case. 
Id., at 542. 
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With the case reversed and remanded to the labor commission, the Court of Appeals in 
Hales specifically referenced ERF's potential liability (the Fund) in endnote five under 
§68(2)(b)(ii), as follows: 
We express no definite opinion on an issue likely to surface on remand, namely, 
whether petitioners' claim should have been asserted against the fund [Employers' 
Reinsurance Fund] rather than respondents and, if so, whether their petitioner may 
now be amended to join the fund. We note, however, that §68(2)(b)(ii) appears 
only to contemplate a continuation of death benefits bv the fund in situations where 
the employer's responsibility has first been determined within the six-vear period 
and does not appear to hold open the avenue of proceeding directly against the 
fund in situations, like this one, where death occurs outside the six-year period. 
Id. at 542. (Emphasis supplied.) 
Thus, the Court of Appeals in Hales expressly held that §68)2)(b)(ii) contemplates "a 
continuation of death benefits bv the fund in situations where the employer's responsibility has 
first been determined within the six-year period. . . ." Since the employer's liability in Hales 
had not been first determined within the six-year period, the Court of Appeals gave no 
"definitive opinion" on this particular issue. However, that uncertainty does not apply to the 
instant case. In the instant case, Kathleen Mae Moore has been specifically receiving death 
benefits from the employer since May 13, 1991, about two years after the decedent's date of 
injury of July 1, 1989. Moreover, petitioners are continuing to pay Ms. Moore death benefits 
to the present date. 
To conclude, the analysis in Hales applies specifically to the instant case because Ms. 
Moore has been receiving death benefits, from the employer or its carrier, within six years 
from the date of injury. Therefore, under the analysis of the Court of Appeals in Hales, the 
-18-
benefits to f\ Is Moore at the expiration of the first six years should continue to be paid to hei 
by the Employers' Reinsurance Fund. 
CONCLUSION 
Read in tandem, Section 68 and Section 70 of the Act provide that an employer or 
c a n ici iiiiiiiMI p a s d e a l 1» I r m i i f s ftti u p In il ' w e e k s a f l r i llm ill lit: mil lilt iiiiiiiiiii M n i l ilii 
Employers' Reinsurance Fund making payments thereafter. In analyzing this exact issue in 
Hales v. Industrial Commission, the Utah Court of Appeals specifically referenced "a 
: .:tl i bei lefits bj til: le • fi ind" I it l :Iet S e c t i o i i 6 8 I "Il: :ie C :::n n il:: if 
thus follow the plain language of Section 68 and Section 70 and award benefits to Ms. Moore 
from the Employers' Reinsurance Fund. As a part of its Order, the Court of Appeals should 
reqi lii e the Employer s ' R n n i M • . . . « • . - . - . 
Moore in excess of 312 weeks of benefits. 
Respectfully submitted this 2nd day of July, 1998. 
CKBURN & 
Michael E. Dyer // 
Dori K. Petersen [/ 
Attorneys for petitioners, Stouffer Food 
Corporation and/or Liberty Mutual Insurance Co. 
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ORME, Judge: 
Petitioners appeal the Industrial Commission's order 
denying their motion for review of an administrative law 
judge's decision holding they were not entitled to depen-
dent death benefits. The basis of petitioners' appeal is 
that the statute under which their claims were denied, 
Utah Code Ann. § 35-1-68(2) (1979), is an unconsti-
tutional statute of repose. We agree and accordingly 
reverse the Commission's order, nl 
nl Because we find the section an unconstitutional 
statute of repose, we need not address petitioners' 
second argument that the provision violates their 
equal protection rights under the Utah Constitution. 
See Warde v. Industrial Comm'n, 831 P.2d 123, 
130 (Utah App. 1992); Wrolstad v. Industrial 
Comm'n, 786 R2d 243, 244 (Utah App.), cert, de-
nied, 795 R2d 1138 (Utah 1990). 
[**2] 
FACTS 
David K. Hales sustained a compensable injury on 
May 24, 1982, while employed by Emery Mining 
Corporation. He was initially paid temporary, total dis-
ability compensation and was awarded 32% permanent, 
partial disability compensation for orthopedic and in-
ternal medical problems, anxiety, depression, and in-
tractable pain. Eventually, he was awarded perma-
nent, total disability compensation. Mr. Hales died 
on November 25, 1988, more than six years after the 
accident. 
Petitioners allege that the cause of Mr. Hales's death 
was his industrial accident and, as required by Utah 
Code Ann. § 35-l-68(2)(a) (1979), they filed depen-
dents' death claims within one year of the date of his 
death. Emery Mining Corporation, Mr. Hales's em-
ployer, and its workers' compensation insurance carrier, 
Energy Mutual Insurance Company, denied responsibil-
ity for death benefits based on the time limitation found 
in Utah Code Ann. § 35-1-68(2) (1979), which pro-
vides, in part: 
In case injury causes death within the period of six years 
from the date of the accident, the employer or insurance 
carrier shall pay the burial expenses of the deceased as 
provided in section 35-1-81, and further benefits [**3] 
[provided in subsequent subsections of section 68, in-
cluding payments to the deceased's dependents]. 
On April 3, 1992, the administrative law judge held 
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that petitioners' claims were indeed barred by this statute 
because Mr. Hales died more than six years after the ac-
cident that allegedly caused his death. On April 17, 
1992, petitioners filed a motion for review with the 
Commission alleging that the statutory provision in sec-
tion 35-1-68(2) violated the Utah Constitution's open 
courts provision by extinguishing their constitutional 
right to litigate a valid claim before their right to file that 
claim arose. See Utah Const, art. I, § 11. On May 6, 
1992, the Commission affirmed the administrative law 
judge's decision. In so doing, the Commission noted 
the likelihood that it would be reversed by this court 
on the authority of Wrolstad v. Industrial Commission, 
786 R2d 243 (Utah App.), cert, denied, 795 R2d 1138 
(Utah 1990), and Velarde v. Industrial Commission, 831 
P. 2d 123 (Utah App. 1992), but expressed [*539] the 
view it had no power to rule on the statute's constitu-
tionality. n2 [**4] 
n2 The Industrial Commission also expressed con-
fusion as to whether judicial review of its decision 
would be initially in this court or by trial de novo in 
the district court. The administrative law judge's de-
cision and the Industrial Commission's review con-
stitute formal adjudicative proceedings. See Utah 
Code Ann. § 63-46b-4 (1989). Review is properly 
in this court. Utah Code Ann. § 63-46b-16 (1989). 
See, e.g., Velarde v. Industrial Comm'n, 831 P.2d 
123 (Utah App. 1992); Wrolstad v. Industrial 
Comm'n, 786 R2d 243 (Utah App.), cert, denied, 
795 R2d 1138 (Utah 1990). No purpose would be 
served by a trial de novo in the district court where 
the relevant facts are not in dispute and the issue 
is solely one of law. Cf. Alumbaugh v. White, 
800 R2d 825 (Utah App. 1990) (per curium) (dis-
puted factual finding, made without formal hearing, 
reviewed by trial de novo in district court). 
[**5] 
STANDARD OF REVIEW 
The Utah Administrative Procedures Act permits us 
to grant relief if the petitioners have been substantially 
prejudiced because "the agency action, or the statute or 
rule on which the agency action is based, is unconsti-
tutional on its face or as applied." Utah Code Ann. § 
63-46b-16(4)(a) (1989). Whether the statute is constitu-
tional presents a question of law which we consider de 
novo. See Velarde, 831 P2d at 125. 
ISSUE ON APPEAL 
Petitioners assert that Utah Code Ann. § 35-1-68(2) 
(1979), and the various versions thereof subsequently 
enacted in the course of amendment and recodification, 
is an unconstitutional statute of repose in violation of 
Article I, Section 11, of the Utah Constitution. Section 
35-1-68(2) provides that employers or their insurance 
carriers shall pay death benefits to dependents only when 
the work-related injury "causes death within the period 
of six years from the date of accident." Petitioners claim 
this statute leaves dependents without a remedy if an in-
jured worker survives more than six years from the date 
of his industrial injury and then dies. Because the statute 
terminated the dependents' cause [**6] of action before 
it arose, petitioners argue, the statute acts as one of re-
pose. Furthermore, petitioners argue that no adequate, 
alternative remedy exists and thus the statute of repose 
is unconstitutional. See Berry v. Beech Aircraft Corp., 
717 R2d 670, 680 (Utah 1985). 
ANALYSIS 
A. Introduction 
The difference between a statute of limitations and a 
statute of repose is that 
[a] statute of limitations requires a lawsuit to be filed 
within a specified period of time after a legal right has 
been violated or the remedy for the wrong committed is 
deemed waived. A statute of repose bars all actions after 
a specified period of time has run from the occurrence 
of some event other than the occurrence of an injury that 
gives rise to a cause of action. 
Berry v. Beech Aircraft Corp., 717P.2d 670, 672 (Utah 
1985). "A statute of repose . . . prevents suit a statu-
torily specified number of years after a particular event 
occurs, without regard to when the cause of action ac-
crues." Velarde v. Industrial Comm'n, 831 P.2d 123, 
125 (Utah App. 1992). An action accrues, generally, 
"upon the [**7] happening of the last event necessary to 
complete the cause of action." Becton Dickinson & Co. 
v. Reese, 668 R2d 1254, 1257 (Utah 1983). 
In the instant case, petitioners' cause of action accrued 
upon the death of Mr. Hales, yet the six-year period of 
section 68(2) had already run so as to bar the asser-
tion of their claim. Consequently, section 68(2) acts as 
a statute of repose. See Velarde, 831 R2d at 126-27 
(statute denying silicosis death benefits unless death re-
sults within three years from last day employee worked 
held to be unconstitutional statute of repose). Unless 
the law provides an "effective and reasonable" alterna-
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n3 If there is no substitute or alternative remedy 
provided, the statute of repose may be justified only 
if there is a clear social or economic evil to be elim-
inated" and the means selected to remedy the evil are 
not "arbitrary or unreasonable." Berry, 717R2d at 
680. Respondents do not argue that there is any 
social or economic evil to be eliminated and, there-
fore, the issue is confined to whether a reasonable 
alternative remedy is available. 
[**8] 
[*540] Respondents argue that section 35-1-68 does 
not violate the open courts provision of the Utah 
Constitution "because Petitioners can still pursue their 
claims against the Employers Reinsurance Fund," for-
merly the second injury fund. Respondents claim sec-
tion 35-1-68(2) does not cut off the claims of the de-
ceased's dependents, but merely limits the liability of 
the employer or insurance carrier for death benefits to 
the period of six years from the date of the employee's 
injury. As to benefits payable after the six years, de-
pendents have an alternative remedy by pursuing their 
claims against the special fund, provided for in section 
35-1-68(1), under Utah Code Ann. § 35-1-70 (1988). 
Section 70 provides, in its entirety, as follows: 
If any wholly dependent persons, who have been receiv-
ing the benefits of this title, at the termination of such 
benefits are yet in a dependent condition, and under all 
reasonable circumstances should be entitled to additional 
benefits, the industrial commission may, in its discre-
tion, extend indefinitely such benefits; but the liability 
of the employer or insurance carrier involved shall not 
be extended, and the additional benefits allowed shall 
[**9] be paid out of the special fund provided for in 
Subdivision (1) of Section 35-1-68. 
Utah Code Ann. § 35-1-70 (1988)(emphasis added). 
Respondents argue that petitioners were receiving ben-
efits under "this title," and thus have an alternative rem-
edy pursuant to section 70, because Mr. Hales was re-
ceiving permanent, total disability benefits under Utah 
Code Ann. § 35-1-67 (1988). That section states that 
an "employee shall receive" compensation which 
may not be more than 85 % of the state average weekly 
wage at the time of the injury . . . [and] may not be less 
than the sum of $ 45 per week, plus $ 5 for a dependent 
spouse, plus $ 5 for each dependent child under the age 
of 18 years, up to a maximum of four such dependent 
minor children. . . . 
Utah Code Ann. § 35-1-67 (1988) (emphasis added). 
Based upon the above quoted statutes, respondents ar-
gue that although the employee receives the check under 
section 67, the dependents are included in the calcu-
lations determining benefits and the dependents, there-
fore, are receiving benefits, albeit through the injured 
employee. Consequently, respondents continue, peti-
tioners were receiving benefits pursuant to section 70 
[**10] and may proceed against the special fund pro-
vided for in section 35-1-68(1). Respondents conclude 
that even if section 68(2) extinguishes petitioners' death 
benefit claims against the employer before they arise, 
this alternative remedy available to them through section 
70 precludes section 68(2) from being unconstitutional. 
Respondents bolster their argument by submitting that 
if section 70 did not apply in the instant case, it would 
never apply. 
Petitioners respond by arguing that just because the 
minimum permanent disability compensation an em-
ployee may receive pursuant to section 67 includes, as 
part of the calculation, $ 5 for a dependent spouse plus 
$ 5 for each dependent minor child, the dependents here 
were not necessarily "receiving the benefits" for pur-
poses of section 70. Furthermore, petitioners submit, 
without contravention, that Mr. Hales's disability pay 
did not include the $ 5 per dependent allowance referred 
to in section 67 because he was collecting the maxi-
mum weekly rate without the additional dependents' al-
lowance being considered. 
By analyzing both the scheme of the relevant statutes 
and their history, we conclude that section 70 does not 
provide [**11] the beneficiaries with an "effective and 
reasonable alternative remedy." Berry, 717 R 2d at 680. 
B. Statutory Scheme 
The statutory scheme specifically distinguishes be-
tween employee payments and [*541] payments to de-
pendents. Section 35-1-66 sets out the compensation 
that an "employee . . . may receive" for his or 
her permanent, partial disability. Utah Code Ann. § 
35-1-66 (1988)(emphasis added). Similarly, section 67 
outlines the disability payments an "employee shall re-
ceive." Utah Code Ann. § 35-1-67 (1988)(emphasis 
added). Both sections provide that the minimum com-
pensation a worker shall receive is to be a sum certain 
plus $ 5 if the worker has a dependent spouse, plus $ 5 
for dependent children under 18, up to a maximum of 
four such dependent children. The maximum compensa-
tion allowed by these sections, which is what Mr. Hales 
apparently received, makes no reference to dependents 
00068 
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and is based on an entirely different formula. Just be-
cause the existence of a dependent spouse or dependent 
children increases the minimum compensation a partially 
or totally disabled employee receives, it does not follow 
that those dependents are [**12] receiving benefits for 
purposes of section 70. There is no requirement that the 
additional $ 5 be paid over to or used for the benefit 
of the dependents. By contrast, section 68 specifically 
provides for benefits that are paid to dependents. See 
Utah Code Ann. § 35-1-68(2) (1988). Thus, section 
70 applies only to dependents who have been receiving 
benefits in their own right. 
A historical review of sections 70 and 68 confirms 
our conclusion that receipt of disability payments by an 
injured employee with dependents does not constitute 
receipt of benefits by dependents for purposes of section 
70. 
C. Statutory History 
The predecessor of the present dependent death ben-
efits statute, Utah Code Ann. § 35-1-68 (1988), was 
first enacted by the Utah Legislature in 1917. 1917 
Utah Laws ch. 100, § 79. That original statute pro-
vided death benefits to dependents, paid by the employer 
or its insurer, for the period "between the date of the 
death, and six years after the date of the injury," but no 
longer. 1917 Utah Laws ch. 100, § 79(2). As origi-
nally adopted, the death benefits ended six years after the 
injury regardless of whether the spouse or child might 
still be [**13] dependent and in need. n4 Obviously in 
an attempt to remedy this harsh scheme, the 1917 death 
benefits statute was amended four years later to include 
the following language, which language is the statutory 
ancestor of the current section 70: 
If any wholly dependent persons, who have been receiv-
ing the benefits of this Act, and who, at the termination 
of such benefits are yet in a dependent condition, and 
under all reasonable circumstances, should be entitled to 
additional benefits, the industrial commission may, at its 
discretion, extend indefinitely such benefits; but the lia-
bility of the employer or insurance carrier involved shall 
not be extended, but the additional benefits allowed shall 
be paid out of the special fund provided for in subdivi-
sion 1 of this section. 
1921 Utah Laws ch. 67, § 3140(7) (emphasis added). 
n4 The failings of such a system are highlighted in 
the scenario where a dependent child was one year 
old at the time of the employee's injury and the ben-
efits ended automatically, with no chance of exten-
sion, when the child was only seven years old. 
[**14] 
The initial placement of the language of section 70 
within the death benefits statute demonstrates that the 
phrase "receiving the benefits" referred to dependents 
receiving benefits - death benefits — in their own right; 
the provision has no relevance to dependents of employ-
ees who have been receiving disability benefits, but who 
have not themselves been receiving benefits. And this 
holds true even if the dependents have been taken into 
account in calculating the amount of disability benefits 
received by the employee. 
In over seventy years since the words now found in 
section 70 were originally adopted, they have remained 
essentially unchanged. The only significant change has 
been that the provision was taken out of the predecessor 
of the death benefits section - section 68 ~ and made 
its own self-standing section in 1933. Utah Rev. Stat. 
§ 42-1-66 (1933). Although this provision [*542] for 
continuing death benefits in special cases has remained a 
self-contained provision up to the present day codifica-
tion in section 35-1-70, its origin as a part of the death 
benefits section is significant. 
Again, the 1921 amendment of the death benefits 
statute remedied the situation in which [**15] the six-
year limitation had run, but an employee's survivors 
were still dependent and in need. This amendment al-
lowed the Industrial Commission to extend benefits, at 
its discretion, for those dependent individuals. So long 
as death benefits as of right automatically ceased af-
ter the six year limitation, the escape valve provided in 
what is now section 70 was necessary to remedy injus-
tices. However, in 1973 the death benefits statute was 
amended to automatically provide benefits "following 
the period during which the employer or its insurance 
carrier is required to pay benefits under this act . . . 
during the period of their dependency." 1973 Utah Laws 
ch. 67, § 5 (codified as Utah Code Ann. § 35-1-68(4) 
(1973)). Under this 1973 amendment, death benefits 
were to be paid, after six years from the date of injury, 
from the special fund provided for in section 35-1-68(1) 
until the termination of dependency. n5 This amend-
ment obviated the need for dependents to seek the dis-
cretionary extension of death benefits under section 70 
because the benefits were now extended as of right, as-
suming only that the individual remained in a dependent 
condition. The 1973 amendment, automatically [**16] 
extending benefits, was recodified in 1979 as Utah Code 
Ann. § 35-l-68(2)(b)(ii) (1979), pursuant to legislation 
that further refined the calculation of benefits to be paid 
"following the expiration of the first six-year period." 
00069 
211 Utah Adv. Rep. i 
1993 Utah App. 
1979 Utah Laws ch. 138, § 3. n6 
n5 We express no definitive opinion on an issue 
likely to surface on remand, namely, whether peti-
tioners' claim should have been asserted against the 
fund rather than respondents and, if so, whether their 
petition may now be amended to join the fund. We 
note, however, that section 68(2)(b)(ii) appears only 
to contemplate a continuation of death benefits by 
the fund in situations where the employer's respon-
sibility has first been determined within the six-year 
period and does not appear to hold open the avenue 
of proceeding directly against the fund in situations, 
like this one, where death occurs outside the six-year 
period. 
J n6 The former Utah Code Ann. § 35-l-68(2)(b)(ii) 
( (1979) is now codified as § 35-l-68(2)(a)(ii) (1992 
Supp.). We note that none of the several amendments 
to this section have any bearing on our analysis. Our 
analysis and conclusion apply to all of the permuta-
tions of section 68. 
[**17] 
This legislative history reveals that the phrase "receiv-
ing the benefits" under section 70 was intended to refer 
to the beneficiary receiving benefits in his or her own 
right - i.e., death benefits payable to the dependent -
- not to the employee receiving other kinds of benefits 
calculated in part, and only where the maximum was not 
reached, with reference to dependents. Thus, section 70 
simply does not apply to the instant case. n7 
n7 Admittedly, under the present statutory scheme 
in which the extension of benefits beyond the six-
year period is no longer discretionary with the 
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Commission so long as death benefit recipients re-
main dependent, section 70 would rarely, if ever, be 
applied. It appears the section escaped repeal, as 
no longer necessary, by virtue of its separate section 
status. As a glance at the annotation notes will show, 
the Legislature has repeatedly tinkered with section 
68, unmindful that, from 1973 on, those changes 
rendered section 70, to which no particular legisla-
tive attention seems to have been paid for over seven 
decades, quite unnecessary. 
[**18] 
D. Inadequate Alternative 
Finally, even if we were to assume that section 70 
somehow applies in this case, it does not save the statute 
of repose because it does not provide an effective and 
reasonable alternative remedy. The extension of bene-
fits permitted under section 70 is wholly discretionary. 
This discretionary extension of benefits is not a remedy 
that is constitutionally equivalent to the right to receive 
death benefits that the statute of repose terminates before 
it has accrued. 
CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons, the Commission's deci-
sion is reversed, as it predicted, [*543] and the case is 
remanded for such proceedings as may now be appro-
priate. 
Gregory K. Orme, Judge 
WE CONCUR: 
Russell W. Bench, Judge 
Judith M. Billings, Judge 
00070 
"EXHIBIT 2" 
LABOR COMMISSION OF UTAH 
Case No- 3971 
KATHLEEN MAE MOORE, 




STOUFFER FOOD CORPORATION/ 
LIBERTY MUTUAL INSURANCE 
and EMPLOYERS REINSURANCE 
FUND, 
Respondents. 


















FINDINGS OF FACT 





Hearing Room 3 34, Labor Commission of Utah, 160 
East 300 South, Salt Lake City, Utah, on July 23, 
1997 at 1:00 o'clock p.m. Said hearing was 
canceled per agreement of the parties. 
Barbara Elicerio, Administrative Law Judge. 
The petitioner was represented by Sandra Dredge, 
Attorney. 
The respondents were represented by Michael Dyer, 
Attorney. 
The Employers Reinsurance Fund was represented by 
Erie Boorman, Attorney. 
The petitioner in the above-referenced matter was awarded 
death benefits in 1991, after the death of her husband, resulting 
from a July 1, 1989 industrial accident. The petitioner received 
312 weeks of death benefits, paid by the respondent insurance 
carrier, Liberty Mutual Insurance, beginning on May 13, 1991. On 
April 29, 1997, the Commission issued an order requiring the 
respondent insurance carrier to continue paying death benefits, at 
the conclusion of the 312 weeks. This order was based on written 
information submitted to the Commission by the petitioner, 
indicating that she remained in a dependent status. On June 12, 
1997, the respondents filed a letter with the Commission, 
contesting: 1) the finding of continued dependency and 2) the 
finding that the respondent insurance carrier was to pay the 
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continuing benefits, as opposed to the Employers Reinsurance Fund 
(ERF) paying those benefits. The matter was set for a July 23, 
1997 hearing, but prior to the date of the hearing, the respondents 
wrote the ALJ, indicating that they had decided to withdraw their 
contest to the continued dependency finding. However, the 
respondents indicated that they still objected to the finding that 
it was the respondent insurance carrier, and not ERF, that was 
liable to pay continuing benefits to the petitioner. 
The respondents suggested to the ALJ that the issue 
regarding what entity pays continuing death benefits, after the 
initial 312 weeks, was a legal one, that could be resolved with 
briefing and without hearing. ERF and the petitioner agreed, and 
thus, a briefing schedule was arranged and the hearing was 
canceled. The respondents filed their brief on September 5, 1997 
and ERF (joined by the petitioner) filed its responsive brief on 
September 29, 1997. The respondents replied on October 6, 1997 and 
the matter was considered ready for order on that date. 
ARGUMENT PRESENTED: 
The respondents argue that the statutory scheme applicable 
to this claim is that which was in existence at the time of the 
industrial injury, on July 1, 1989. This is agreed to by all 
parties. What is contested is what that statutory scheme requires. 
The respondents argue that, many years ago, the statutory scheme 
for death benefits resulted in only 312 weeks payable by the 
employer/carrier, with no on-going benefits. Later, the 
legislature enacted what is now U.C.A. 35-1-70, to allow for 
payment of death benefits after the initial 312 weeks, at the 
discretion of the Commission, but making these payments payable by 
a special fund, which is currently called the Employers Reinsurance 
Fund (ERF). Then, the respondents argue that, in 1973, the 
legislature changed this discretionary continuation of benefits to 
an automatic continuation, if dependency continued, with the 
special fund still being the liable entity to pay continuing 
benefits after the initial 312 weeks paid by the employer/carrier. 
The respondents cite the case Hales v. Industrial Commission, 854 
P. 2d 537 (Ut. Ct. App. 1993) as authority, for the historical 
legislative analysis, and as authority for ERF being liable for the 
continued death benefits, payable after the initial 312 weeks. In 
addition, the respondents argue that it was not until 1994 that the 
legislature changed the wording of U.C.A. 35-1-68, to reflect that 
continuing benefits, after the initial 312 weeks, were payable by 
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the employer/carrier (as opposed to by the special fund or ERF). 
The respondents argue that, prior to that 1994 change in U.C.A. 35-
1-68, ERF was the liable entity for continuing benefits after the 
initial 312 weeks of benefits. 
The response of ERF actually agrees that the respondents' 
analysis of the legislative history, up to 1973, is correct. 
However, ERF argues that that history is not really relevant to the 
current controversy. Per ERF, it is the 1979 amendment to U.C.A. 
35-1-68, still in effect as of the date of the deceased's 
industrial accident, in 1991, that applies in this case. ERF 
acknowledges that the 1973 amendment to U.C.A. 35-1-70, cited by 
respondents, specifically placed liability for continuing death 
benefits, after the initial 312 weeks, on the special fund (or 
ERF), but ERF argues that this was changed, in 1979. Per ERF, 
U.C.A. 35-1-68 was amended, in 1979, to reflect that the 
employer/carrier was liable for the continued death benefits, after 
the initial 312 weeks. In addition, ERF argues that, at the same 
time, language in U.C.A. 35-1-68 specifically referring to special 
fund liability, after the initial 312 weeks, was deleted. 
Therefore, per ERF, the 1979 scheme, still in effect in 1991, and 
thus applicable to this case, provides for employer/carrier 
liability only, with no liability for death benefits for ERF. ERF 
also argues that the Hales case, cited by the respondents, does not 
address the issue of ERF liability for continuing death benefits 
beyond the initial 312 weeks of benefits. 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW: 
The ALJ agrees generally with the analysis of ERF and finds 
that there is no liability for ERF for continuing death benefits, 
after the initial 312 weeks, in this particular case. The 
respondents simply fail to recognize, or discuss, in their 
analysis, the 1979 amendment to U.C.A. 35-1-68. It is that 
amendment (i.e. the 1979 amendment) that is the law that applies to 
this case, as it was still in effect in 1991, when the deceased had 
his industrial accident. The respondents stop their historical 
legislative analysis in 1973, and thereby ignore the fact that the 
statutory scheme was significantly changed in 1979. The ALJ agrees 
with ERF, that the Hales case does not address the issue of which 
entity pays benefits after the initial 312 weeks (the Court states 
as much in footnote #5, at 542), and thus, the Hales analysis is 
unhelpful in resolving the issue to be decided in this case. The 
one exception to this would be that Hales does point out that 
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U.CA. 35-1-70 probably should have been deleted from the statutory 
scheme long ago, as it became unnecessary after 1973, when all 
further amendments relating to payment of death benefits were 
placed in U.CA. 35-1-68. The ALJ will elaborate on these 
conclusions to follow. 
The redrafting of U.CA. 35-1-68, in 1979 (which redraft 
applies in this case) , is not a model of clarity, but when viewed 
in context of all the changes, the intention of the drafters can be 
discerned. The ALJ finds that one intention was to remove 
liability for continuing death benefits (after the initial 312 
weeks) from the special fund (or ERF) and place it back on the 
employer/carrier. This intention is discernable in two changes: 
1) the reorganization of the subsections, to place 
the new language regarding payment of continuing 
benefits under the general language describing the 
liability of the employer / carrier (see Laws of 
Utah, 1979, Ch. 138, p. 777, subsection (2) (b) (ii) ) 
and; 
2) the deletion/removal of language, previously in 
the statute, specifically stating that the special 
fund (or ERF) was to pay continuing benefits (see 
Laws of Utah, 1979, Ch. 138, p. 778, subsection 
(2)(d)) interlined language). 
These two above-noted changes, when viewed together, indicate to 
the ALJ that the 1979 legislature sought to shift the liability of 
the continuing benefits back to the employer/carrier. 
Unfortunately, if certain unchanged language, in the 1979 
version of U.CA. 35-1-68, is read out of context of the overall 
changes, they might be read to refer to a continuing limitation of 
employer/carrier liability to 312 weeks only. This is the case 
with the last sentence of Subsection (2) (b) (i) . It indicates "not 
to exceed six years or 312 weeks after the date of injury." 
However, once again, if this is read in context of the entire 
subsection, it becomes clear that this is a limitation on how long 
the employer/carrier pays benefits per the calculation specified in 
(2)(b)(i). In other words the limitation is just on what rate is 
paid for the first 312 weeks. The next subsection, (2) (b) (ii) 
specifies how the calculation is made after the initial 312 weeks. 
However, this subsection, regarding continuing benefits, also deals 
with employer/carrier liability, because it is part of section (2) , 
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which specifies at the beginning "... the employer or insurance 
carrier shall pay • . . benefits in the amounts and to the persons as 
follows.11 
Another part of the statutory scheme, that read out of 
context might suggest a limitation of employer/carrier liability to 
the initial 312 weeks, is U.C.A. 35-1-70. That section was enacted 
to allow discretionary continuation of benefits before the 
automatic continuation was codified in 1973 (in U.C.A. 35-1-68) . 
That statute has been left intact, since it was initially passed, 
even though the continuing benefits that it refers to have been 
addressed in U.C.A. 35-1-68 since at least 1973. This is referred 
to in the Hales case that the respondents have cited for other 
purposes. In footnote #7, at 542, the Court notes that the 
placement of automatic continuation of benefits after the 312 
weeks, in U.C.A. 35-1-68 in 1973, made U.C.A. 35-1-70 unnecessary. 
The Court opines that it should have been repealed when the 
automatic continuation was codified in 1973. The ALJ agrees with 
this logical analysis and finds that the legislature did not mean 
for this section to specify liability for ERF following the initial 
312 weeks of death benefits, after the legislature created 
employer/carrier liability for these continuing benefits in 1979. 
To read it otherwise would mean that the legislature intended to 
have two mutually exclusive provisions to be in existence, one 
specifying employer/carrier liability for the continuing benefits 
and the other specifying ERF liability for those same benefits. It 
is much more logical to presume that U.C.A. 35-1-70 is just an 
unnecessary section that "escaped" repeal, as the Court in Hales 
suggests. 
There is one final element of the statutory scheme that, if 
viewed in isolation, might suggest special fund, or ERF, liability 
for continuing benefits, prior to 1994. This is a 1994 addition to 
the U.C.A. 35-1-68 subsection dealing with the computation of the 
rate to be paid for continuing benefits. In 1994, the legislature 
added the phrase "by the employer or its insurance carrier" to that 
subsection, to designate which entity is paying the continuing 
benefits. The respondents argue that this addition shows that the 
legislature was changing the payor of the continuing benefits, and 
that prior to the change, the special fund or ERF was liable for 
those continuing benefits. The ALJ disagrees with this analysis 
and finds that the 1994 addition was meant only as clarification. 
This is because, as noted above, the subsection dealing with the 
computation of continuing benefits has been located in the section 
dealing with what benefits are payable by the employer/carrier, 
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since 1973. Therefore, even without the 1994 addition of 
clarifying language, the statute logically reads to indicate 
employer/carrier liability for the continuing benefits. The ALJ 
believes that the 1994 addition (made in U.C.A. 35-1-68(5) (a) (ii)) 
was made because, as noted above, due to the length of section (5) , 
the subsections tend to get read in isolation of the initial 
language, indicating that all of the subsections to follow specify 
employer/carrier liability (the subsections are necessary in order 
to show how to compute the benefits in various different 
situations). The 1994 clarifying language simply prevents any 
misunderstanding as to the identification of the payor, if 
subsection (5) (a) (ii) does get read in isolation from the 
introductory language, which also specifies the identity of the 
payor (i.e. the employer/carrier). 
Based upon the foregoing discussion, the ALJ finds that, at 
the time of the deceased's industrial injury in 1991, the death 
benefits statutory scheme, the same scheme in existence since the 
1979 amendment to U.C.A. 35-1-68, specified that the 
employer/carrier was liable for continuing death benefits, 
following the payment of the initial 312 weeks of benefits. 
Therefore, the ALJ affirms the Commission's prior order, issued by 
ALJ Sims on April 29, 1997, and finds that the employer/carrier in 
this matter is liable for continuing death benefits to the 
petitioner. 
ORDER: 
IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that the April 29, 1997 Surviving 
Spouse Benefit Order, ordering Liberty Mutual Insurance to continue 
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IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that any Motion for Review of the 
foregoing shall be received in the offices of the Division of 
Adjudication within thirty (30) days of the date hereof, specifying 
in detail the particular errors and objections, and, unless 
received by the Division of Adjudication within thirty (30) days of 
the date hereof, this Order shall be final and not subject to 
review or appeal. If a Motion for Review is received by the 
Division of Adjudication within thirty (30) days of the date 
hereof, any response of the opposing party shall be filed within 
fifteen (15) days of the date of the receipt of the Motion for 
Review by the Division of Adjudication in accordance with U.C.A. 
Section 63-46b-12. A Motion for Review will be decided by the 
Commissioner of the Labor Commission unless any of the parties 
requests that the Motion for Review be decided by the Appeals Board 
in accordance with U.C.A. Section 34A-1-205 within thirty (30) days 
of the date hereof, or in case of a party responding to the Motion 
for Review, the request must be made within 2 0 days of the date of 
the Motion for Review was filed with the Division of Adjudication. 
DATED this 18th day of December, 1997. 
Barbara Elicerio 
Administrative Law Judge 
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UTAH LABOR COMMISSION 
KATHLEEN MAE MOORE, * 
surviving spouse of William Moore, * 
* ORDER DENYING 
Applicant, * MOTION FOR REVIEW 
v. * 
STOUFFER FOOD CORPORATION, * 
LIBERTY MUTUAL INSURANCE CO, * Case No. 397-0001 




Stouffer Food Corporation and its workers' compensation insurance carrier, Liberty Mutual 
Insurance Co.(referred to jointly as "Stouffer" hereafter), ask the Appeals Board of the Utah Labor 
Commission to review the Administrative Law Judge's determination that Stouffer is liable for 
continued payment of dependent's benefits to Mrs. Moore under the Utah Workers' Compensation 
Act. 
The Appeals Board exercises jurisdiction over this motion for review pursuant to Utah Code 
Ann. §63-46b-12, Utah Code Ann. §34A-2-801(3) and Utah Admin. Code R602-2-1.M. 
ISSUE PRESENTED 
Is Stouffer or the Employers' Reinsurance Fund ("ERF") liable for the continued payment 
of Ms. Moore's dependent's benefits? 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
The parties do not dispute the facts of Ms. Moore's claim. The Appeals Board therefore 
adopts the findings of facts set forth in the ALJ's decision. 
DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
Whether Stouffer or the ERF is liable for continued payment of Ms. Moore's dependent's 
benefits depends on the application of §35-1-68 and §35-1-70 of the Act in effect during 1991, when 
Ms. Moore's husband died as a result of a work-related accident. 
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The ALJ has thoroughly reviewed this question of law and provided a comprehensive 
analysis of the controlling statutory provisions. The ALJ's decision also addresses the specific 
points raised in Stouffer's motion for review. The Appeals Board agrees with the ALJ's analysis and 
therefore adopts the ALJ's decision as its own. 
In affirming the ALJ's decision in this matter, the Appeals Board calls the Legislature's 
attention to the need to update or eliminate the provisions of §35-1-70, for the reasons set forth in 
the ALJ's decision.1 
ORDER 
The Appeals Board affirms the decision of the .ALJ and denies Stouffer's motion for review. 
It is so ordered. 
Dated this Jll day of March, 1998. 
NOTICE OF APPEAL RIGHTS 
Any party may ask the Appeals Board to reconsider this Order. Any such request for 
reconsideration must be received by the Appeals Board within 20 days of the date of this order. 
Alternatively, any party may appeal this order to the Utah Court of Appeals by filing a petition for 
review with the court. Any such petition for review must be received by the court within 30 days 
of the date of this order. 
i 
Effective July 1 1997, §35-1-70 was recodified as §34A-2-702. 
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